Method

ngo case study > thematic criteria

In the NGO database, we will only consider international charities providing physical, legal or moral assistance in situations of crisis, mainly in war-torn societies or in countries about to be rebuilt, bearing in mind that the ending of a conflict is always very fragile.

The investigation focuses on the relationship between humanitarian aid and war, as it is in such a situation that challenges, risks and drifts of relief operations are most striking. Much has already been said about the failures of development assistance in times of peace. The embezzlement of bilateral or multilateral funds is truly regrettable as it can be indirectly responsible for the deaths of people when the budget for a hospital ends up on a bank account in Switzerland and allows dictators to survive economically. But the use of humanitarian aid by the combatants during a fight is far more serious as it directly supplies war economies, and increases the number of casualties as it contributes to buying weapons and making conflicts last longer.

The field of investigation is also limited to NGOs. Not because donor states and intergovernmental organizations are not concerned by the issue. But because charities and humanitarian NGOs are more numerous and less known. As they try to avoid the political constraints of states, they are in charge of a heavier moral burden and claim to be the watchdogs of international ethics; they challenge decision-makers and seek public generosity by incarnating “the conscience of the world”.

In the history of an NGO, special interest is thus dedicated to the social origin and the ideological motivations of its founders and executive members; to its relations both in the head office country and in the countries of intervention with trade unions, political parties, military forces and religious movements, as well as the press and the judiciary; to the strategy of the organization regarding its programmes; to the problems encountered in the field (expulsions, assassinations, accidental deaths); to the impact on the recipient populations…

Aid Watch does not pretend to be exhaustive. Only the most relevant NGOs are considered. On an institutional level, the study does not consider the various collective bodies that gather operators, as ICVA (International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 70 members) in Switzerland and VOICE (Voluntary Organizations In Co-operation and Emergency, 95 members) or CONCORD (Confederation for Relief and Development, 1600 members, which replaced in 2003 CLONG [Committee of Liaison of NGOs, 938 members]) in Europe, not to mention religious groups like APRODEV (Association of Protestant Development Agencies, 19 members) created in 1990 for the Protestants or ICDS (International Committee for Development and Solidarity, 16 members) created in 1969 for the Catholics. Neither does it look at public offices and intergovernmental specialized agencies: refugees directorates in developing countries or bilateral co-operation departments in developed countries, as for instance USAID (United States Agency for International Development). The only exception is ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), halfway between an NGO and an intergovernmental organization as it is for 90% publicly funded, it has a status of observer at the United Nations and it is the watchdog of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Protection of Civilian Persons.

Finally, in developing countries, the study will put aside charities without a formal NGO structure in the modern sense of the word: trade unions, students associations, doctor’s or engineer’s corporations, Sufi brotherhoods and Christian missions whose social work was born far before the humanitarian trend, etc. Much attention is dedicated, in that prospect, to possible “straddling” between donors and recipients of programmes, which makes it possible to distinguish between: tribal unions where the number of donors is usually smaller than the recipients’; co-operatives and professional corporations in which the two groups almost overlap; and the religious communities in which the number of donors can be higher than the number of recipients.

ngo case study > strategic criteria

Introduction

Five criteria are proposed to describe a humanitarian NGO and to analyse its strategic position in an armed conflict:

1) the ideological involvement;
2) the political neutrality in the field of action;
3) the proportion of public and private funds;
4) the transparency;
5) the analytical capacity to be self-critical, or politically aware.

These parameters are different from the ones generally used by donors, namely: administration and programmes expenses, the capacity to react quickly to emergencies, the logistics involved, a good financial management, etc.

1/ Criteria of ideological involvement and political neutrality

As far as strategy is concerned, a clear difference must be made between the ideological involvement of an NGO and its impossible neutrality in the field. Let us make these concepts of ideological and political neutrality clear. Ideological neutrality consists in not showing an “a priori” position before intervening in a war-torn country. Once there, political neutrality consists in not taking position for one side of the conflict. In practice, such an objective often remains a wish since the aid brought to victims infringes war logic. Used for ethnic cleansing or military victory, hunger has always been a weapon. In the Middle Ages, warriors were already besieging whole cities; nowadays, third world combatants do not act differently. Theoretically, “natural” famines should not even exist if we are to consider the progress of technology, which allows to go against the hazards of the climate, and the development of transport, which makes it easier for farming surplus to be brought to areas which need them, that is if such areas are not under a military blockade.

There are two humanitarian strategies in this regard. The first one aims at supplying “equally” each of the parties of a conflict, even if it implies privileging regions already well supplied, and making assistance plans according to the military forces in presence rather than according to the actual needs. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has often defended this position, and has thus been able to have quite a good national coverage of countries like Sudan or Somalia, which gained it a reputation of impartiality, but compelled it to feed populations that were not always starving. On the contrary, another strategy, less costly for smaller NGOs, consists in trying to fulfil the victims’ needs according to available assessments, but this provokes anger among those who don’t get assistance, and it politicizes humanitarian workers.

However, an impossible political neutrality in the field is to be distinguished from ideological involvement. In fact, some so-called “humanitarian” NGOs deliberately choose a side. The “religious” ones are a typical example when they follow a proselyte goal, be it Islamic or Christian fundamentalism. Yet all of them do not have a highly pronounced political bias, including in wars with much denominational aspects. The “ecumenical” NGOs, which praise for dialogue between religions, help populations in need whatever their individual beliefs. Inversely, some non-religious NGOs take fighting positions, like the “humanitarian branches” of guerrillas, or the “offshoots” of dictatorships. When they realize the impossibility of remaining politically neutral in the field, some charities from developed countries also decide to support openly one side – it was especially true of the Scandinavians in Southern Africa, in Nicaragua and in Sudan. Others stand for the interests of their homeland. It is beyond doubt that NGOs, as they are ideally placed on frontlines, are sources of intelligence for diplomats who latter complain about getting their nationals out of “forbidden” areas. NGOs also provide information for the media, who use humanitarian workers and logistics to report on conflicts.

2/ Criteria of financial independence and transparency

As it is linked to the interference of governments, the proportion of public and private resources in the budget of an NGO is another important criterion, if we are to consider the impedimenta of a contracted assistance and the conditions of the programmes financed by various states. It must be said that these ratios are given by NGOs themselves: a researcher does not have the means to go through accounts and is not entitled to do so. Another important point to make is that the proportion of public funds does not always involve a political dependency towards the institutional backers. Considering the great variety of humanitarian “dispensers”, an NGO can very well diversify its public funds, while an intergovernmental organization can also call on people’s generosity, or foundations’ or companies’: about one third of the resources of UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) comes from private donations, and the UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) has created associations for that purpose in France and Great Britain.

After a quick description of the budget, the analysis will be sharpened with an index of transparency. Some associations do not publish any annual report on their programmes and accounts. To “publish” means to make these reports available to other people than the sole private donors or institutional backers or members of the NGO. This can be done reliably by putting them online on Internet (mail or telephone requests to the head office are much more unpredictable).

A six-point gradation sets up a hierarchy in this regard:

Level 0: no annual or financial report available on Internet;
Level 1: no financial report available on Internet. The website gives access to a mission statement but there are no exhaustive lists of interventions per country and no information on actual expenditures;
Level 2: the website gives access to only one financial report, dated from the previous year or older. There are no data about actual expenditures per country or per programme. At best, the annual report looks like an advertisement pamphlet and provides no exhaustive list of interventions;
Level 3: the NGO’s website fulfils one of the two following expectations. Either it gives access to several financial reports dated from the previous year or older. Or it gives access to only one financial report but completes the picture with an exhaustive list of interventions and/or data on actual expenditures in the field;
Level 4: the NGO’s website gives access to one or several financial reports, the latest being two years old maximum. There are also exhaustive lists of interventions and more detailed data on actual expenditures, especially regarding earmarking and the origin of financial resources per country or programme;
Level 5: confirming its accountability on a regular basis, the NGO’s website gives access to one or several financial reports, the latest being two years old maximum. There are also exhaustive lists of interventions and detailed data on actual expenditures, especially the source, the names and the origin of funding per country or programme. The percentage of earmarking helps to clarify the situation in this regard. Even better, annual reports really try to assess difficulties from a self-critical perspective.

These indicators were developed by Aid Watch in 2007 in order to analyse the accountability of international NGOs’ and their political dependency towards institutional backers. Earmarking is a strategic issue and financial reports seldom provide data that could show for instance how some NGOs in Iraq today are funded by parties to the conflict, i.e. the United States and the United Kingdom. The One World Trust’s Global Accountability Report also developed interesting indicators about access to online information. To give as fair a picture as possible, it photographed the organisations’ websites in 2002. It checks if a public information disclosure policy exists, applies to both archives and current data, lists the available documents and explains adequately the criteria for non-disclosure in order to avoid withholding information on an ad-hoc basis. Moreover, the Global Accountability Report assess if the main website can be converted into a different language, if it identifies the organisation’s members, if it explains the powers and responsibilities of the executive, if it gives information about their activities, their governing articles and their board. Eventually, the One World Trust checks if an annual report is available online, if it describes an organisation’s activities, if it contains financial statements and if it provides an audit report.

At this stage, it must be said that, unlike the One World Trust’s Global Accountability Report, Aid Watch focuses on access to information and activities only. It does not address the member control of NGOs’ governance structures because this good practice is more difficult and subjective to assess. The One World Trust’s Global Accountability Report is concerned about the access to decision making online, i.e. the agenda of governing and executive bodies within a year, as well as draft papers, minutes and key decisions of governing and executive bodies’ meetings. For instance, it looks at voting procedures, the rule of the majority, the fair and equitable representation of all members, their power to amend constitutions, to add items to the agenda of governing body meetings, to nominate, elect or dismiss individuals on the executive, etc. Yet the definition of “member” is limited to the national sections or affiliates or groups of an international NGO. It does not include individual members and does not check the governance within affiliates at the national level. From a formal point of view, it means that an international NGO can be considered as democratic even if its affiliates are not.

3/ Criterion of the capacity to be self-critical, or politically aware

That last criterion consists in studying an NGO’s analytical capacity and culture of self-criticism, i.e. the ability to:

– evaluate the consequences, in the local context, of its actions before, during and after a humanitarian programme;
– assess the quality of the actions independently of the donors;
– adjust a programme as it is implemented, and if necessary, sack the individuals implied in cases of sexual abuse, robbery, violence or corruption;
– withdraw from situations where the aid is obviously hijacked by the combatants.

Here, the focus is on an organization’s strategy. Whether a support to fighters is chosen or imposed makes all the difference, considering the political character of aid. In order to help populations at risk, some choose their side openly, as the International Brigades did during the Spanish civil war in 1936. Their help loses its humanitarian meaning when it comes to supporting a military effort and does not only consist in paying a bribe to gain access to the victims of conflicts. This option separates a “mercenary” volunteer service from the compromises of an NGO which, in order to save lives, sees its logistics being hijacked for military purposes, without being able to prevent it, and plays the role of the Red Cross of an army or a guerrilla.

When studying the history of an NGO, particular attention is thus dedicated:

– to the conditions in which a programme is started or ended;
– to lobbying through the diplomacy or the media;
– to the links with political parties, governmental armies and rebel movements;
– to the warlords extortion and racket;
– to the possible discriminations in medical care and food distribution;
– to the impact of aid in war-torn countries, especially regarding embezzlement, abduction, assassination of humanitarian workers, etc.

4/ “Humanitarian intelligence”

Considering the complexity of relief programmes in armed conflicts, the criterion of the political awareness is finally what enables to understand the professional performance of an NGO. In fact, none of the other criteria is sufficient, taken alone, to identify the humanitarian character of a charity.

Indeed, an NGO’s ideological involvement does not always imply dubious programmes. A support to a guerrilla can turn out to be positive as long as it respects the Geneva Conventions. Among the various “humanitarian branches” of African armed movements, ERA (Eritrean Relief Association) and REST (Relief Society of Tigray) were very different from empty shells like the SRRA (Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association), in Sudan, and they have really sought to help people in need respectively in Eritrea and Ethiopia. In other words, the support to a belligerent can be less important than the incapacity to appreciate the reliability of local partners. The fairness of a political cause is certainly not enough to certify the humanitarian position of one of the parties at war: fighting the Islamic junta in power in Khartoum, for instance, does not turn the SRRA into the democratic apparatus of a guerrilla famous for its violations of human rights. In the same way, good intentions are no excuse for humanitarian blindness.

The impossible political neutrality in the field, another strategic criteria, is not so much of a problem when it shows a real empathy with the victims. Politicisation is not always opposed to humanitarian goals since it assigns international NGOs to watch, testify, report, advocate and lobby, especially during multilateral negotiations on the protection of refugees, human rights, environment or the establishment of a criminal court in charge of punishing crimes against humanity. Handicap International did much in favour of the treaty banning the use of landmines. Thanks to many petitions, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins sans frontières) managed to get a parliamentary committee to inquire on the role of France in Rwanda; not to mention the active diplomacy of mediators such as the Community of Sant’Egidio which helped to put an end to the civil war in Mozambique in 1992.

The financial dependence on institutional backers is not a discriminatory criterion either, as we have seen: NGOs can diversify their public funds to avoid being the subcontractor of a donor state, and they sometimes even give up official support when the pursuit of an aid operation is counter-productive for the victims. Moreover, private funds are not untouched by conditions. Some corporate donors are deeply involved in the preparation of programmes and they impose geographical or thematic constraints on a humanitarian project. This tend to be a problem patrons like mining or oil companies are already parties to a conflict.

The absence of transparency, finally, is not automatically the sign of bad will, especially when one thinks about the small third world associations which cannot even afford a computer. From that point of view, the analytical capacity of a humanitarian actor constitutes without doubt the most important criterion in the matter. During emergencies, only a few NGOs take the time to try, more or less empirically, to understand the local context and to adapt their programmes in consequence. As the staff of an NGO changes frequently, and there is little “institutional memory”, learning the lessons from the past is not easy.

fIve commandments

Ethical discussions on aid are not something new. They are even at the very core of the humanitarian movement. Nevertheless, in a context of armed conflicts, the actors’ relation to violence keeps raising many questions. Aid Watch opens the discussion with the following issue: despite the diversity of humanitarian cultures, is it possible to find universally applicable ethical commandments to implement aid programs?

The discussion is divided into five propositions:

1) A religious NGO that only proselytises does not fulfil humanitarian work when the “salvation of souls” is linked to conversion blackmail, is discriminating and does not come with material assistance.
2) An NGO that shows an ideological bias in favour of one of the fighting sides is beyond the field of humanitarian action, even if it really provides care in the area of intervention chosen according to its political views.
3) An NGO that, beside the charity work, boasts support to the fighters, supports arms smuggling or turns a blind eye to military activities within its logistics line is also reprehensible; as far as self-defence is concerned, the proportionality principle limits the right to reply, in particular when the distribution of aid is supervised by private military companies or by the United Nations troops of a peace enforcement operation.
4) An NGO that does not penalize among its employees individual misconduct – either criminal or political – is as blameworthy.
5) Finally, NGOs that accept funds from combatants (guerrillas, sectarian or terrorist groups, governmental armies that do not respect the Geneva Conventions on the protection of civilians) or from companies that take part in the conflict dynamics directly as they exploit raw materials with a high added value (oil, diamonds, precious stones, rare ore) tend to put themselves outside the scope of humanitarian action.